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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE 
MICH IO TOMINO, 
vs. 
STATE OF UTAH 
Plaintiff-
Respondent, 
GREATER PARK CITY 
COMPANY, a Utah 
corporation, 
Defendant-
Appel lant. 
APPELLANT'S REPLY BRIEF 
Case No. 14835 
Defendant submits the following brief in response to 
certain new matters raised in the Brief of Respondent: 
I. 
THE TRIAL JUDGE ERRED IN STRIKING DEFENDANT'S 
AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE, AND THIS ERROR IS PROPERLY 
BEFORE THIS COURT FOR REVIEW 
Defendant's principal contention on this appeal is that 
the trial court erred when it struck the affirmative defense from 
defendant's original answer. This order was erroneous, whether 
the motion upon which it was based was made pursuant to Rule 12 
or, as plaintiff now insists, Rule 56. In either event, plaintiff 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
fell far short of meeting the burden of a party moving for 
summary disposition of an affirmative defense. In Respondent', 
Brief, plaintiff refuses to discuss the standards that govern 
either a Rule 12 or a Rule 56 motion. Plaintiff realizes, it 
appears, that his showing on the motion did not meet the standa: 
of either rule. 
In Appellant's Brief, the showing that plaintiff had 
to make is discussed in terms of a Motion to Strike, since the 
Rule 12 designation that plaintiff had chosen for the motion ru 
afoul of the requirement that pleadings must be "closed" before 
a motion for judgment on the pleadings is proper, and the purpo 
of the motion was, in fact, to strike a defense . 1 In Responden'. 
Brief, plaintiff carefully avoids any discussion of the burden 
he had to carry on his motion. Instead, he dismisses any con-
sideration of this burden as a "procedural bag of tricks." 
He is content to point out that his motion was perfectly proper 
as one for partial summary judgment and leave it at that. 
Plaintiff's motion for summary disposition appeared tc 
be a Rule 12 motion. No affidavits were filed with it. Only 
the opening round of pleadings were before the court. Even 
plaintiff thought it might be a Rule 12 motion and named it 
1. Defendant does not claim 
pp. 14-15 of Respondent's Brief, that 
motion, but only that it was improper 
for judgment on the pleadings. 
-2-
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"Motion for Judgment on the Pleading or • . However, when 
it is called to plaintiff's attention that, as a Rule 12 motion, 
it cannot be for judgment on the pleadings and appears to be a 
motion to strike, plaintiff asks that Rule 12 be forgotten, and 
that the motion be considered " • for Partial Summary Judgment. " 
Plaintiff points out there was nothing wrong 
with the motion as one for partial summary judgment. While this 
is true, the motion would more appropriately be considered as 
a motion to strike. Of course, a "Motion to Strike or for Partial 
Summary Judgment" would have had an odd ring and compelled more 
careful attention to plaintiff's burden. Professor Moore has 
stated, "If a motion for summary judgment is based solely on the 
pleadings, as it may be, then there is no functional difference 
between that motion and a motion for judgment on the pleadings." 
6 J. Moore Federal Practice ,, 56.09 at 65-166 (2d Ed. 1976). 
The same thought would apply to a motion to strike and a motion 
for summary judgment. Clearly, if a motion denominated as a 
motion for partial summary judgment is equivalent on the face 
of the pleadings and the state of the records to a motion to 
strike, then it must be governed by the law of Rule 12, not 
Rule 56. If the rule were otherwise, a party could choose the 
relatively less stringent standards of Rule 56 over the standards 
of Rule 12 by merely choosing to name his motion one for summary 
judgment. 
-3-
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Even if plaintiff's motion is considered 
a motion 
for partial sununary judgment, it did not meet the require-
ments of Rule 56. This rule requires that before a 
summary 
judgment may be granted, the moving party must show " that ther0 
is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the movin: 
party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." This Court 
has said, "Such showing must preclude all reasonable possibili: 
that the loser could, if given a trial, produce evidence which 
would reasonably sustain a judgment in his favor." Bullock v. 
Deseret DodgeTruck Center, Inc., 11 Utah 2d 1, 5, 354 P.2d 
559 (1960). 
The trial court erroneously accepted plaintiff's 
position that the Purchase Agreement itself established 
that plaintiff had no duty to act in good faith to obtain the 
franchise. 2 Plaintiff had made no showing that would justify 
2. The trial court would have had to determine that 
the meaning of the contract was "plain and clear" without any 
knowledge of the circumstances surrounding its formation. The, 
error of this is discussed at pages 16 through 22 of Appellant 
Brief. On the same subject, Corbin says, 
"It is sometimes said that if the words of a contract 
are plain and clear, evidence of surrounding circum-
stances to aid interpretation is not admissible. But 
some of the surrounding _circumstances always mus~ be d 
shown before the meaning of the words can be plain an 
clear; and proof of the circumstances may make a 
meaning plain and clear when in the absence of su~h 
proof some other meaning may also have seemed plain 
and clear." 3 Corbin on Contracts § 542 (1961) 
-4-
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this conclusion in the face of the burden that it must appear 
to a certainty that plaintiff would succeed in spite of any 
facts that could be proved in support of the defense,3 or 
that there was no reasonable possibility that defendant could, 
given a trial, produce evidence which would reasonably sustain 
a judgment in his favor. The trial court's conclusion to 
the contrary disregarded the rule stated by this Court in 
Zion's Properties, Inc. v. Holt, 538 P.2d 1319, 1321 {Utah 
1975) : 
"We accept the correctness of [the] argu-
ment that there is implied in any contract a 
covenant of good faith and cooperation, which 
should prevent either party from impeding the 
other's performance or his obligations there-
under; and that one party may not ••. take 
advantage of the non-performance he has caused." 
{Emphasis added) . 
The trial court also ignored the language in the contract con-
cerning the "intention of the parties" which was called to 
its attention,4 the contradictions between its determination 
and the language of the agreement, and the substantive legal 
principles governing the construction of contracts of 
purchase and sale and conditions precedent. These matters 
are discussed in detail in Appellant's B~ief in terms of 
3. This is the burden on a motion to strike. Leh-
nann Trading Corp. v. J & H Stolow, Inc., 184 F. Supp. 21 
(S .D • N • Y • 19 6 0) . 
4. See p. 10 , infra. 
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of the standards for a motion to strike. The arguments made 
there are equally applicable to a motion for surrunv.ry judgment 
Plaintiff's bare assertion that this motion was not 
improper as a motion for summary judgment does not establish 
that the necessary showing was made to have the motion grant,: 
In fact, plaintiff's only statement with respect to "burden," 
at page 17 of his brief, is that the burden was on defendant 
to raise issues of fact. Plaintiff does not talk about 
this subject because he has nothing to say. He clearly 
failed to meet his burden. This court has said repeatedly 
that upon a motion for summary judgment the contentions of 
the party opposing the motion should be considered in a light 
most favorable to that party, with all doubts resolved agains: 
the moving party and in favor of permitting the issue to ~ 
to trial. Foster v. Steed, 19 Utah 2d 435, 432 P.2d 60 
(1967); Controlled Receivables, Inc. v. Harman, 17 Utah 2d 
420, 413 P. 2d 807 (1966). A somewhat elaborate statement of 
this burden, incorporating many federal cases is as follows: 
"The courts are in entire agreement that the 
moving party for summary judgmenthas the . 
burden of showing the absence of any genuine 
issue as to all the material facts, which, 
under applicable principles of substantive 
law, entitle him to judgment as a matter of 
law. 
The courts hold the movant to a strict standard. 
To satisfy his burden, the n!ovant must make a 
showing that is quite clear what the truth is, 
and that excludes any real doubt as to ~he 
existence of any genuine issue of material fact. 
-6-Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Since it is not the function of the trial court 
to adjudicate genuine factual issues at the 
hearing on the motion for sununary judgment, in 
ruling on the motion all inferences of fact 
from the proofs proffered at the hearing must 
be drawn against the movant and in favor of the 
party opposing the motion. And the papers 
supporting the movant's position are closely 
scrutinized, while the opposing papers are 
indulgently treated, in determining whether 
the movant has satisfied his burden." 
6 J. Moore Federal Practice ~I 56.15[3] at 56-463-
472. 
Defendant submits that when plaintiff's motion was granted, 
substantial doubts remained as to what the truth was, and these 
doubts were resolved in favor of plaintiff, the moving party. 
The Purchase Agreement was treated indulgently in support 
of plaintiff's contentions, and scrutinized closely (or 
ignored completely) insofar as it supported defendant's 
contentions. These errors fatally infected the subsequent 
proceedings. 
Plaintiff wants the motion considered one for summary 
judgment, not because he complied with his burden on such a 
motion, but because he can impute a certain remissness to 
defendant's counsel for not having affidavits before the 
court concerning the Sheraton Franchise. Plaintiff says: 
"Therefore, [because the hearing on the 
motion had been continued several times], counsel 
for Defendant had four months in which to raise 
any issue they wanted to raise, in which to ~ile 
affidavits, in which to submit memoranda (which 
they did ..• ) , or to raise any questions they 
desired." (Resp. Brief at 16). 
-7-
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If it was a Rule 56 motion, these statements make 0 s me slight 
sense, not in relationship to the rules governing the motion, 
but in a crude practical sense: shouldn't one file affidavit; 
on a motion for summary judgment, even if the opposition has 
not. If the sense of this is granted, then one can also 
impute a quality of ungentlemanly conduct to present counsel 
for even broaching the subject of what standard governs the 
motion for summary disposition on an affirmative defense: 
"[C]ounsel for Defendant, not having repre-
sented Defendant at the time of Judge Croft's 
Summary Judgment, are seeking to raise issues for 
the first time on appeal in hopes of relitigating, 
virtually de novo, issues previously handled by 
other counsel, who, in their own judgment, either 
neglected or did not feel it appropriate to raise 
the issues now raised . 
* * * 
. now being dissatisfied with the previous 
handling of the case and with the benefit of 
'twenty-twenty hindsight' , counsel seeks to raise 
newborn issues, de novo on this appeal." 
(Resp. Brief at I4 & 16) . 
And defendant's present counsel may not appreciate 
certain facts that were once clearly recognized: 
"Both parties went forward on the motion, 
full-well knowing that the only evidence before 
the Court was the written contract itsel~ 
The parties clearly recognized that the issue 
presented on the motion was one which could be 
resolved by the contract itself and witho~t the 
need for additional evidence." (Resp. Brief at 
16-17.) 
All of this, of course, is nonsense. Defendant's original 
-8-
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counsel had every right to proceed on plaintiff's motion 
as they did, and to rely on the pleadings, the contract, and 
the standards governing such motions for sununary disposition, 
without filing an affidavit or submitting extrinsic evidence. 
Plaintiff claims that the presentation of the stan-
dards governing motions to the attention of this court, 
raises "new issues on appeal." (Resp. Brief at 14-17). 
These standards are not "issues", but rules of law governing 
the disposition of motions to strike or motions for summary 
judgment. Such fundamental rules governing motion practice 
cannot be disregarded merely because they are not explicitly 
argued to the trial judge. They are one of the fundamental 
premises from which consideration of any motion for summary 
disposition begins. 
Plaintiff also claims that the parol evidence rule 
was never presented as an issue to the trial court. Again, 
the parol evidence rule is not an "issue"; it is rule of 
law for determining whether an issue should be decided only 
from the contract itself or whether extrinsic evidence may 
be considered. In this case, defendant pled, as an affir-
mative defense, that plaintiff failed to use good faith 
efforts to obtain the franchise. Clearly, the question of 
whether the parties to the Purchase Agreement intended that 
good faith be a part of the contract was in issue. It might 
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be determined, on a more appropriate hearing, that the 
contract was integrated, but, for the reasons set out in 
Appellant's Brief, it was not appropriate to make this deter-
mination on a motion for summary disposition. Yet it is 
obvious that such a preliminary determination was necessary 
to the trial court's ruling. 
In fact, the issues raised by the parol evidence rule 
were presented to the trial judge, although the rule was 
not called by name. The memorandum filed by defendant in 
opposition to the motion for summary disposition of its affir· 
mative defense begins as follows: 
"THE TERMS OF THE PURCHASE CONTRACT AND THE 
PLEADINGS HEREIN RAISED AN ISSUE AS TO THE 
DUTY OF THE CONTRACT PURCHASER TO MAKE A 
REASONABLE EFFORT TO OBTAIN A FRANCHISE. 
"Paragraph 26 of the Contract between the 
parties provides in its entirety as follows: 
"26. It is the intention of the parties 
that the Inn and all other facilities con-
structed by Purchaser upon the Subject 
Property will be operated pursuant to a 
franchise granted by Sheraton Inns, Inc., 
which shall identify the same as a 
Sheraton Inn or by a similar name and shall 
provide for reservation, supervisory and 
other services customary with Sheraton 
Inns, Inc., franchises. [Here the memo sets 
out the balance of ,, 26) [Emphasis in 
original memorandum.) 
"The above-quoted language stresses the 
intention of the parties that a Sheraton 
Franchise can be obtained and the importance t 
of obtaining such a franchise. It is clear tha 
a reasonable and good faith effort be made by 
-10-
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the purchaser to secure the franchisR . . . " 
(Emphasis added) (R. 65-66) 
Clearly, defendant argued that the Purchase Agreement itself 
showed that plaintiff must use "reasonable and good faith 
efforts to secure the franchise." Plaintiff, on the other 
hand, argued that the intent of the parties was clearly that 
no good faith efforts to obtain the franchise were required. 
Thus, the intent of the parties was squarely before the trial 
judge. Whether or not on oral argument the parol evidence 
rule was mentioned, the evidentiary problems that the parol 
evidence rule governs were before the trial court. 
Plaintiff confuses "issues" with "arguments" when he 
states that these "issues" were not raised below. In 
5 Am.Jur.2d Appeal & Error §546 at 32, it is said: 
"The rule requiring adherence to the theory 
relied on below does not mean that the parties 
are limited in the appellate court to the same 
reasons or arguments advanced in the lower court 
upon the matter or question in issue." 
See also First Nat'l Bank of Mayfield v. Gardner, 376 S.W.2d 
311, 314 (Ky. 1964); Dewey v. City of Des Moines, 173 U.S. 
193, 43 L.Ed. 665, 19 sup. Ct. 379 (1899). The issue below 
was whether or not the affirmative defense was so clearly 
insufficient that it could properly be stricken upon a 
motion to dispose of it summarily. This is precisely the 
issue presented to this Court. 
The cases cited by plaintiff in support of his 
-11-
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contention concerning "new issues on appeal" i'n f t · 
ac invol%'. 
new issues or theories, not arguments, that had not been 
presented in the trial court. In Meyer v. De 1 uke, 2 3 Utah 
2d 74, 457 P.2d 966 (1969), the defendant sought for the firs: 
time on appeal to interpose a defense of unconscionability 
or unclean hands, 2 3 Utah 2d at 7 8 • In In Re Es ta te of Ekker, 
19 Utah 2d 414, 432 P.2d 45 (1967), appellant, a protestant 
in a will contest, contended for the first time on appeal 
"that the will is void because of material mistake of fact 
and law appearing on the face of the will; [and] that the 
testator was suffering an insane delusion at the time he 
executed the will; . • " In both of these cases this 
Court clearly rejected the consideration of new "issues" or 
"theories" on appeal. In neither of them nor any other case 
which defendant could discover has this Court stated that it 
will not consider arguments in support of an issue raised in 
the trial court if the argument was not explicitly presented 
to the trial court. 
II. 
WHETHER OR NOT THE PURCHASE AGREEMENT 
IS AN ALTERNATIVE CONTRACT, THE ORDER 
WAS ERRONEOUS 
After dismissing as a "procedural- bag of tricks" 
any consideration of the standards governing his motion for 
. the "merits 
summary disposition, plaintiff deigns to discuss 
-12-
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of Judge Croft's Order" granting the motion. It? must be 
remembered that this discussion is in reference to an order 
granting a "Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings or for 
Partial Summary Judgment," which, of course, presupposes that 
the moving party had met a stringent burden. Plaintiff 
would have it assumed, without discussion, that there is no 
other reasonable possibility than that the parties to the 
Purchase Agreement intended that the purchaser could "obtain 
the Sheraton Franchise and proceed with the contract or • . • 
alternatively ... not obtain the Sheraton Franchise, recon-
vey the property, and pay interest • to the period [sic] 
of termination." (Resp. Brief at 24.) Plaintiff relies, 
too, on the unspoken assumption that even with all inferences 
from the contract drawn against him and for defendant, and 
with plaintiff's position on the contract closely scrutinized 
and defendant's position indulgently treated, it is still 
quite clear what the truth is: no real doubt exists that 
any considerations of plaintiff's good faith in the Sheraton 
Franchise application should be sticken from the proceedings. 
All this is true, plaintiff contends, because the Purchase 
Agreement is a contract for alternative performance. 
It is necessary for plaintiff to leave certaiR pre-
mises unspoken and ambiguous in this argument. It might be 
thought, if it were not for other language to the contrary_ 
-13-Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
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that defendant is arguing that an alternative contract cannn, 
have conditions on the alternatives. 5 This is contradicted 
by the Utah case plaintiff cites, Bradbury v. Fillinga~, 84 
Utah 178, 35 P.2d 772 (1934), in which the co:-itract required 
that one alternative be performed by a certain date. In 
the Purchase Agreement in our case, these words seem to 
state a condition to an election to terminate under para-
graph 26: "In the event that such franchise . . . is not 
obtained • II Plaintiff does not argue that, if theH 
words state a condition, no promise to use good faith 
efforts to obtain the franchise is implied. Such an argu-
ment would fly in the face of overwhelming authority.6 
Instead, plaintiff takes a much more daring posi-
tion: "That such franchise is not obtained" is not a con-
dition at all, but an element of performance: 
"In the instant case, under paragraph 26 as 
it is written, the purchaser may fulfill the con-
tract in one of two ways - he may obtain the 
Sheraton Franchise and proceed with the contract 
5. "Nor is this a case where the purchaser is 
seeking to avoid liability by refusing to perform a con-
dition precedent • . . • Appellant has conveniently ig-
nored the entire concept of alternative performance even 
though that was stressed and argued extensively before 
11 
Judge Croft at the time the motion was originally heard. 
(Resp. Brief at 23.) 
6. Zion's Properties, Inc. v. Holt, 538 P.2d 
1319, 1321 (Utah 1975); see generally, 3 Corbin on Con-
tracts § 570 (1961), "Implied promises to perform a con-
dition or to render co-operation that is necessary to 
another's performance." 
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or he may, alternatively, not obtain the Sheraton 
Franchise, reconvey the property, and pay interest 
on the total purchase price for the period from the 
date of the contract to the period of termination." 
(Resp. Brief at 24-25, emphasis added.) 
And again: 
"[T]he failure to obtain the ••. franchise 
was . merely an alternative performance under 
the contract ..•. " (Resp. Brief at 25.) 
This is a remarkable argument. It is difficult to believe, 
particularly with the certainty required for summary judgment, 
that the parties to the Purchase Agreement had any interest in 
the purchaser abstaining from efforts to obtain the Sheraton 
Franchise, or acting so as not to obtain it. Why would the 
seller require that the franchise be obtained if the contract 
is performed according to its primary purpose but require 
that it not be obtained if the purchaser wishes to perform 
pursuant to another alternative. If it is not a condition 
on the alternative of termination, it is difficult to see why 
"not obtaining the franchise" is mentioned at all. Why did 
the parties not say simply, "In the event purchaser gives GPCC 
notice not later than June 15, 1974, it shall have the right 
to reconvey the property to GPCC and pay interest." How 
can a "failure to obtain" a franchise be performance. What 
reasonable (or rational) parties would include it as an 
element of performance. 
Of course, parties can enter into enforceable 
contracts that seem irrational or unreasonable, but the 
-15-
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rules of construction require a reading that is reasonable, 
if possible. 7 In this action, all that is required to impute 
to the parties something approaching rationality is to con-
strue the words "franchise is not obtained" to be a conditioo, 
not a statement of performance expected. Plaintiff's con-
struction impels to the conclusion that the parties were 
somewhat daft. 
Paragraph 26 of the Purchase Agreement does not fit 
the concept of an alternative contract very well in any event. 
The purchaser's first "alternative" - payment of the full 
purchase price and construction of the Sheraton Hotel - is 
bargained for in return for the conveyance of the land in 
fee by the seller. The second "alternative" - reconveyance 
and payment of interest - is bargained for in return for 
the return by the seller of all purchase monies paid and 
the termination of all other obligations under the contract. 
The seller's obligation is clearly different, depending on 
the "alternative" chosen by the buyer. The concept of 
alternative performance, as stated by the authorities, 
does not comprehend such a difference: 
"If, upon a proper interpretation of the 
contract, it is found that the parties have agreed 
that either one of the alternative performances 
is to be given by the promisor and received by 
7. See, e.g., Western & Southern Life~ 
Vale, 213 Ind-:--6°01-;-12 N.E.2d 350 (1938). 
-16-
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the promisee as the agreed exchange and equivalent 
for the return performance rendered by the promisee, 
the contract is a true alternative contract." 
Corbin on Contracts § 1082 (1964). 
The case of Pearson v. Williams, 24 Wend. 244 (N.Y. 1840), 
cited by plaintiff, illustrates this principle: the plaintiff 
conveyed land, a single performance, for the return performance 
by defendant of erecting two brick houses or, in the alterna-
tive, paying $4,000.00. 
Plaintiff points out that there are differences 
between paragraphs 8 and 26 of the Purchase Agreement. 
Paragraph 8 makes explicit mention of diligence in the pursuit 
of certain permits. Paragraph 26 makes no explicit mention 
of diligence in pursuit of the Sheraton Franchise. Plaintiff 
claims for this comparison that it leads "to the obvious 
conclusion that [the parties] knew the language with 
which to accomplish [the] result" of imposing "some affir-
mative obligation on the part of the purchaser to use diligence 
in obtaining the Sheraton Franchise." Defendant submits 
that with this same linquistic talent the parties could 
easily have made of paragraph 26 the simple statement of 
alternative performance that plaintiff claims for it. 
That they did not do so lends absolutely no credence to the 
interpretation of the contract urged by the plaintiff. 
Certainly, there is no logical reason to infer that because 
a promise or condition is ext>ress with respect to one subject, 
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it must be express with respect to .another subject or 
not exist at all.8 
III. 
THE TRIAL COURT'S CONCLUSION 
CONCERNING FORFEITURE ivAS IMPROPER 
Plaintiff enumerates seven "facts" which, he contend, 
were "present glaring, and totally persuasive" of the pro-
position that, even if plaintiff is not entitled to invoke 
paragraph 26, the provisions of paragraph 25 are unconsionabl' 
and the sum to be paid under paragraph 26 is about right in 
any event. 
These "facts" are arithmetical and appear on the 
face of the contract or the pleadings: The purchase price was 
$630, 000. 00; the period between February 7 and June 13 is 
approximately four months; interest on the purchase price 
for four months is $21,024.99; and the purchaser had paid 
$125,000.00 toward the purchase price. Plaintiff gets 
three separate facts from the statement that a deed was never 
delivered to plaintiff and plaintiff never took possession. 
These facts are indeed "clear." But not one 
of them goes to the question of what "realistic view of 1~5 
• . • might have been contemplated by the parties" when the 
liquidated damages provisions were agreed to. Jensen v · 
Nielsen, 26 Utah 2d 96, 485 P.2d 673 (1973). Plaintiff 
8. 
64 (19611 See generally, 3 Corbin on Contracts § 5 
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would rather disrega~d any consideration of what the parties 
intended when they entered the contract and decide whether 
liquidated damages are an unconscionable forfeiture on 
the basis of such criteria as "percentage" and "time lapse." 
However, this court has said repeatedly that it will not 
interfere with the bargained-for provisions of a contract to 
declare a liquidated damage provision a forfeiture, unless 
it appears that the forfeiture could not reasonably have been 
within the contemplation of the parties when the contract 
was entered. There is simply no evidence in the record to 
indicate what the parties might have had in mind when the 
liquidated damage provisions were drafted. Without such 
evidence, the conclusion that this provision is unconsion-
able is clearly improper. 
Even if the conclusion were proper, there is abso-
lutely nothing in the record in this case or any place else 
to support plaintiff's statement that "Chase brass [sic?] 
interest on the total purchase price ($21,000.00) is certainly 
a sufficient and reasonable award to defendant for any _damages 
it could conceivably suffer." (Resp. Brief at 35.) If, in-
deed, the liquidated damages provisions are an unconsionable 
and unenforceable forfeiture, then damages must be deter-
mined according to the usual rules (see authorities cited 
at page 33 of Appellant's Brief.). Plaintiff does not even 
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attempt to justify the damages of $21,000 00 as compl · 
· y1ng 
with these rules, but makes the simple declaration that it 
"is certainly a sufficient and reasonable award to defendan• 
for any damages it could conceivably suffer." There is no 
law that supports such a measure. 
VI. 
CONCLUSION 
The judgment in this case cannot be supported 
either by arguments that good faith was not required of 
plaintiff or by arguments that the liquidated damage 
provisions were a forfeiture. Nor is there any merit in 
plaintiff's argument that the finding that Development 
Services acted in good faith.is supportable. 
However, it is not the judgment that is so much in 
error as the first order entered in this case. This order 
striking the affirmative fatally infected the remaining 
proceedings. The subsequent partial surrunary judgments were 
the logical consequence of this order. The presentation of 
evidence at trial was limited by it. The procedural 
imbroglios that plaintiff recounts with repressed delight 
were the result of defendant's attempts to impress into the 
record tbe evidence that the t:r;ial court improperly decided 
it did not need to hear. 
Defendant should be given a fair chance to have 
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its case heard. The judgment should be reserved. 
Respectfully submitted, 
PRINCE, YEATES, WARD & GELDZAHLER 
-~i;; I - I , 
By /1 L ;~ --lL~ l---_ 
F/ S.cPrince, CJt., Esq. 
J~ Rand Hirschi, Esq. 
Attorneys for Appellant 
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